Obsessed by the cases where things go wrong, we pay too little attention to the vastly more numerous cases where they go right, and where it is perhaps easier to see that the descriptive content of the expression concerned is wholly at the service of this function [of identifying reference], a function which is complementary to that of predication and contains no element of predication in itself (Strawson [1974], p. 66).

**SECTION 0**

In this paper, I am concerned with two semantic questions about demonstratives; particularly about complex rather than bare demonstratives. The first, very general, question is this. What is the function of the expression 'man' in 'that man', or the expression 'man wearing a carnation' in 'that man wearing a carnation', or the expression 'admirer of Mary's' in 'that admirer of Mary's'? In short, what is the semantic function of the matrix of a complex demonstrative?

I was moved to ask this general question by a concern with a second, more specific, question; a question about the semantic coherence or incoherence of sentences of a rather peculiar kind. It is not, perhaps, a question that will grip the imagination of every philosopher of language. In the sentence

Mary loathes that admirer of Mary's (of hers)

the name 'Mary' occurs twice. Are these positions open to quantification? That is, can we form such a sentence as

$$(3y)[y \text{ loathes that admirer of } y's]$$

a sentence which presumably would surface as

Some woman loathes that admirer of hers?

More generally, given a sentence of the form

$$\Phi(a,(\text{That } x)\Psi(x,a))$$
(where 'That' is a variable binding operator used in the formation of
complex demonstratives), can we quantify into the positions occupied by
'a' (particularly, into the position occupied by 'a' within the matrix of the
complex demonstrative) to yield a quantified sentence of the form

\[(Qy)[\Phi(y, (That \, x)\Psi(x, y))]\]

As Barry Taylor has shown, the answer to this second question is related to
a choice between two ways of providing a truth theory for a language con-
taining demonstratives. He calls them 'the method of conditional assignment
of truth-conditions' and "the method of scope-distinction".¹

I do not ask these two semantic questions because I think that answers
to them will shed light upon the philosophy of mind; upon the nature of
demonstrative thoughts, for example. On the contrary, I begin from an idea
of Christopher Peacocke's about perceptual demonstrative thoughts,² and
use that to motivate answers to the semantic questions. I reach that starting
point towards the end of Section 2. Thereafter, my strategy is as follows. I
use Peacocke's idea to motivate an initial account of the use of perceptual
demonstratives in communication: an account of the contents of the
thoughts expressed and of the assertions made (Section 3). I then use that
account to argue for a choice in favour of the method of conditional assign-
ment of truth conditions in a truth theory for bare demonstratives, and for
complex demonstratives (Section 4). The initial account can be extended to
give a more complete answer to our first question in any of three ways
(Section 5). A choice between these three ways, and the prior choice of the
method of conditional assignment of truth conditions, jointly determine
the answer to our second question. As it turns out, the quantification is
coherent only if the surface form of demonstrative sentences is massively
misleading as to underlying semantic structure. Since there is no indepen-
dent reason to suppose that this is so, I conclude that the quantification is
indeed incoherent (Section 6). Finally, I note some empirical evidence that
seems to support my conclusion, and make some brief remarks about the
relation between syntax and semantics (Section 7).

SECTION 1

My starting point is an idea of Christopher Peacocke's about perceptual
demonstrative thoughts. I shall reach it towards the end of Section 2. First,
I shall summarise some familiar ideas about *indexical* demonstrative thoughts.

Associated with indexical expressions, such as ‘I’, ‘now’, and ‘here’, are *ways of thinking* of objects (or *modes of presentation* of objects). In an ‘I’-thought one thinks of an object, namely oneself, in a way in which one can think only of oneself, and in which no one else can think of one. Let us call this way of thinking ‘[I]’. And what goes for ‘I’, the way of thinking [I], and the thinker, goes *mutatis mutandis* for ‘now’, the way of thinking [now], and the time of the thought, and for ‘here’, the way of thinking [here], and the place of the thought.

Suppose two thinkers a and b think thoughts which each would express by ‘I am hot’. What is in common between the two token thought events can be represented by the ordered pair

\[
\langle [I], \text{being hot} \rangle.
\]

I shall say that their thoughts have the same *intrinsic content*. But a’s and b’s thoughts are thoughts concerning different objects. They have different truth conditions, and perhaps different truth values. This difference is reflected in the difference between these ordered pairs:

\[
\langle a, \text{being hot} \rangle
\]

\[
\langle b, \text{being hot} \rangle.
\]

I shall say that the thoughts have different *referential contents*. The ordered pair

\[
\langle \langle a, [I] \rangle, \text{being hot} \rangle
\]

brings together elements from the intrinsic and referential contents of a’s thought. I shall call it the *extrinsic content* of his thought.3

There is no shortage of terminology surrounding these intuitive distinctions. In Perry’s scheme, intrinsic content corresponds to the sentence or text *accepted*, while referential content corresponds to what is *believed*. Extrinsic content corresponds to believing something *in a certain way*, to believing something *by* accepting a certain text. Likewise, the way of thinking associated with an indexical demonstrative corresponds to Perry’s *role*.4 In his more recent scheme, explicitly tied to situation semantics, [I] corresponds to the linguistic meaning (cf. Kaplan’s character), and the
object \( a \) corresponds to the *interpretation* in a discourse situation.\(^5\) In Evans's scheme, extrinsic content corresponds to a *Fregean thought*. \([I]\) corresponds to a *way of thinking*, to a *type of account* that can be given of what makes the thought have the object it does, and consequently to some *relation* \( \lambda x \lambda y \, R(x, y) \). \( \langle a, [I] \rangle \) corresponds to the *sense* of 'I' in the mouth of \( a \), to a *particular account* of what makes the thought have the object it does, and consequently to some *relational property* \( \lambda x \, R(x, a) \).\(^6\) In Peacocke's scheme, also, extrinsic content corresponds to a Fregean thought. \([I]\) corresponds to a *type* of mode of presentation, and \( \langle a, [I] \rangle \) to a *token* mode of presentation.\(^7\)

These differences in terminology correspond *inter alia* to different views about Frege. Thus, while Evans believed 'that a Fregean approach to demonstrative expressions is essentially correct', Perry thinks that 'Fregean sense [is] a confusing mixture of interpretation and meaning'.\(^8\) But, for present purposes, that difference is less important than a point that is not disputed. Of the two components of the pair \( \langle a, [I] \rangle \), the way of thinking \([I]\) is 'on the side of the mind' and the object \( a \) is 'on the side of the world'. What is not in dispute is that, in the context of a token thought event, the component that is on the side of the mind determines, or fixes, the component that is on the side of the world. Equivalently, the intrinsic content, and the causal and more generally contextual relations in which the token thought event stands, jointly determine the referential, and consequently the extrinsic, content. Thus, for example, '... character or role ... takes us from the subject's identity and position in the world to reference' (Perry); 'A way of thinking about an object is given by an account of what makes some thinking about that object' (Evans); 'there cannot, for a given person at a given time, be token [modes of presentation] which he can employ in his thought, and which differ only in respect of the objects which index the type [modes of presentation]' (Peacocke).\(^9\)

**SECTION 2**

Let us now turn to perceptual demonstrative thoughts. It is not plausible to hold that there is a (type of) way of thinking \( W \) associated with the bare demonstrative 'that' or with the complex demonstrative 'that man' (used in perceptual confrontation with objects) such that the intrinsic content of all
perceptual demonstrative thoughts expressible by 'that is hot' or 'that man is hot' is captured by the ordered pair

\( \langle W, \text{being hot} \rangle \).

For objects may present themselves perceptually in different modes (visually, aurally etc.), and may present themselves differently even in a single mode. I shall concentrate on visual perception. A (type of) way of thinking, or (type of) mode of (visual) presentation must include, at least, an element corresponding to a type of (visual) perceptual experience. (Cf. Perry on 'ways of seeing'.) I shall use 'II' for such an element.

The relevant kind of experience is not merely an experience (as) of seeing a certain scene. It is rather an experience (as) of seeing a scene and having a particular feature of the scene or (loosely speaking) a particular object in the scene psychologically salient for one. The nature of this salience will be made clearer by the role that such experiential elements of thought play in what follows. For now it may help to imagine having one’s eye upon (in the sense of fixating) a certain feature, or (what is not quite the same) having one’s attention fixed upon a certain feature, although neither of these is strictly necessary. (Cf. Kaplan’s ‘picture with a little arrow pointing to the relevant subject’.)

But such an experiential element is not itself a way of thinking. For, in the context of a token thought event, it does not yet determine an object as the object thought about. Such an element, and the contextual relations in which the token thought event stands (particularly, the casual relations between the thinker and the scene before his eyes), jointly leave several objects with competing claims to be the object thought about. In general, these competing claims correspond to varying evaluations of the thought for truth or falsity.

To the extent that II, and the context of a’s thought at t, jointly determine a man d to be the object of a’s thought they also jointly determine as the object of that thought a temporal slice of a man, a front surface of a man, a mereological union of parts of a man, an aggregate of molecules constituting a man, and doubtless various other objects of more or less recherché sorts, objects which are not identical with the man d. And in general these differences matter for truth evaluation. Perhaps d will still exist tomorrow although the temporal slice of d will not exist tomorrow.
Perhaps $d$ is heavy although the front surface of $d$ is not heavy. Perhaps $d$ will one day have a finger cease to exist and yet go on existing himself although the mereological union of $d$'s parts will not endure through that finger's ceasing to exist. Perhaps $d$ has been here before although the aggregate of molecules constituting $d$ has not been here before.

If a (type of) mode of (visual) presentation is to determine an object relative to a context, then that mode of presentation must include a conceptual, as well as an experiential, element. What determines an object is not merely $\Pi$, but $\Pi$ plus a concept $C$ of a sort of spatio-temporal object (a sortal concept). This is why we were speaking loosely when we spoke of a particular object being salient; apart from the sortal concept $C$, several objects of various sorts are equally salient. I shall represent a (type of) mode of visual presentation, or way of thinking of an object visually presented, by an ordered pair $<\Pi, C>$. Thus, the intrinsic content of a particular thought might be

$$<\Pi, \text{being a man}>, \text{being hot}>$$

for some $\Pi$, and the referential content might be

$$<d, \text{being hot}>.$$ 

In that case, the extrinsic content would be

$$<d, <\Pi, \text{being a man}>>, \text{being hot}>.$$ 

Here we have a fairly full representation of the content of a perceptual demonstrative thought, concerning a visually presented man $d$, expressible by 'That man is hot'.

In such a thought concerning $d$, the two concepts being a man and being hot are employed in very different roles. Let us say that the concept being a man is employed in an individuative role, while the concept being hot is employed in a predicative role. Clearly, the individuative role cannot be assimilated to the predicative role. To do so is to forgo any account of what makes the man $d$ the object of a particular thought with that intrinsic content. If a thinker is to secure an object for his thought, then he must employ in the thought a concept in an individuative role.

We have reached the promised starting point, in the following idea about perceptual demonstrative thoughts.14
The notation ‘\((d, \langle \Pi, \text{being a man}\rangle, \text{being hot}\rangle)\)’ provides a sense in which in the thought ‘that man is hot’, the concept of a man does not serve to make a predication of something already identified in thought, but serves to assist in the identification of the object thought about.

This account of perceptual demonstrative thoughts is very different from description theories of such thoughts. The heart of the difference lies in Burge’s distinction between thoughts which are fully conceptualised and thoughts which are not fully conceptualised but ‘whose correct ascription places the [thinker] in an appropriate nonconceptual, contextual relation to objects the [thought] is about’. According to Peacocke’s account, perceptual demonstrative thoughts are irreducibly different from fully conceptualised, descriptive thoughts; they are irreducibly \textit{de re}. According to description theories, such demonstrative thoughts are just descriptive thoughts; the term ‘\textit{de re}’ does not mark a distinctive kind of thought but, at most, a distinctive kind of ascription of thoughts. A further difference is that, according to Peacocke’s account, special significance attaches to the class of sortal concepts. For sortal concepts are especially suited to resolve the indeterminacy left by the nonconceptual, contextual (in particular, perceptual) relations, as to which object is being thought about. Thus, sortal concepts are especially suited to play an individuative role in thought. According to description theories, no special significance attaches to the class of sortal concepts.

\section*{SECTION 3}

Let us now take some steps in the direction of an idea about the use of perceptual demonstratives in communication, analogous to Peacocke’s idea about perceptual demonstrative thoughts. The doctrine that in successful communication the hearer (audience) comes to have a thought with the same content as the thought expressed by the speaker obviously needs to be complicated in the case of communication using demonstratives. We need to consider the speaker’s intentions, and then the notion of the content of an assertion.

Suppose that a speaker \(a\) assertorically utters ‘I am hot’ to express his thought, whose extrinsic content is
He does not intend that his audience $b$ should come to have a thought with that same extrinsic content, nor even a thought with the same intrinsic content. One thing that $a$ intends is that $b$ should have a thought, concerning $a$, to the effect that he is hot. He may, in addition, have intentions about the way in which $b$ is to think of him. Another thing that $a$ intends is that $b$ should recognise that $a$ has a thought whose intrinsic content is

$$\langle [I], \text{being hot} \rangle.$$  

These two intentions are not unrelated. It is very plausible that $a$ intends or expects (à la Grice) that $b$'s recognition of $a$'s thought should be part of $b$'s reason for his own thought, concerning $a$, to the effect that he is hot. If that recognition is to be part of that reason then, it seems, $b$ must recognise $a$ as the object of $a$'s ‘$I$'-thought. And, if that is so, it is plausible that, at some point in the communicative transaction, $b$ has some such thought as

The object of $a$'s ‘$I$'-thought is hot.

But it is not $a$'s primary intention that $b$ should have such a thought; $b$'s having such a thought is not sufficient for a successful communicative transaction.\(^{16}\)

We should not identify the content of the assertion that $a$ performed with the extrinsic content of the thought that $a$ expressed.\(^{17}\) Rather, we should take as the content of the assertion what is, as a matter of linguistic convention, in common between the thought that $a$ expressed and the thought that $b$ was intended to arrive at ultimately. Whether, on this account, there is more to the content of the assertion than the referential content $\langle a, \text{being hot} \rangle$ is not a question we need to pursue. But there is certainly no reason to think that the content of the assertion will involve the concept being the object of $a$'s ‘$I$'-thought, or the concept being the object referred to by ‘$I$'.

Analogous points about speaker's intentions and about the content of assertions can be made in the case of communication using perceptual demonstratives. If an object $d$ is (visually) presented to $a$ in a way ($II, C$) then, even if $b$ employs the same concept $C$ in an individuative role, that same object $d$ will, in general, be presented to $b$ in a different way.
INDIVIDUATION AND DEMONSTRATIVES

⟨Π', C⟩, where Π' differs from Π as a result of b's different point of view upon the world. Thus, if speaker a assertorically utters 'That man is hot' to express his thought whose extrinsic content is

⟨⟨d, ⟨Π, being a man⟩⟩, being hot⟩

then he does not, in general, intend that his audience b should come to have a thought with that very same content. One thing that a intends is that b should have a (perceptual demonstrative) thought, concerning d, to the effect that he is hot. But we can say more. For it is surely a conventional feature of the use of the complex demonstrative 'That man' that the speaker intends the audience to employ the concept being a man in an individuative role. So a's primary intention is that, for some Π' (perhaps differing from Π as a result of b's different point of view upon the world), b should have a thought

⟨⟨d, ⟨Π', being a man⟩⟩, being hot⟩.

Another thing that a intends is that b should recognise that a has a (perceptual demonstrative) thought, concerning d individuated under the concept being a man, to the effect that he is hot. It is plausible that a intends or expects that b's recognition of a's thought should be part of b's reason for his own thought. If that recognition is to occur then, it seems, b must recognise d as the object of a's thought (individuated under the concept being a man). And, if that is so, it is plausible that, at some point in the communicative transaction, b has some such thought as

The object individuated by a under the concept being a man is hot.

But it is not a's primary intention that b should have such a thought; b's having such a thought is not sufficient for a successful communicative transaction.

Here again, we should take as the content of the assertion what is, as a matter of linguistic convention, in common between the content of the thought that a expressed and the content of the thought that b was intended to arrive at ultimately. Certainly, the two thoughts have the same referential content. But, further, as a matter of linguistic convention, the same concept being a man is employed in an individuative role in both
thoughts. So, we can represent the content of the assertion by an ordered triple

\( \langle d, \text{being a man}, \text{being hot} \rangle \)

There is certainly no reason to think that the content of the assertion involves the concept being the object individuated by \( a \) under the concept being a man, or the concept being the object referred to by 'that man', or the concept being demonstrated (as a man) by \( a \). (This will be important in Section 4, below.)

Consider now the following example. A thinker \( a \) is gazing upon the scene before him and starts attending to a particular feature of the scene (in fact, a man/temporal slice of a man/front surface of a man/mereological union of parts of a man/aggregate of molecules constituting a man). He individuates the man \( d \) in question by employing the concept being a man in an individuative role. Continuing to fix his attention upon \( d \) thus individuated, \( a \) comes to believe \( d \) to be hot. Furthermore, \( a \) wants to communicate this belief to his audience \( b \) who is standing beside him. What \( a \) has to do is to direct \( b \)'s attention to the man \( d \) and then get \( b \) to have a thought with the same content as \( a \)'s thought (since, in this case, \( a \) and \( b \) share a point of view upon the world). The audience \( b \) is gazing upon the same scene as \( a \) is, but without attending to the same feature. An utterance by \( a \) of 'that' accompanied by an act of pointing may at least direct \( b \)'s attention in the right direction. ('The scene is selectively enlivened by the conspicuous intrusion of a finger in the foreground of a chosen subject, or by the motion of a finger outlining a chosen region.') Pointing indicates angle but not range. But because of shared beliefs about the features of scenes to which human attention is most easily directed, \( a \)'s utterance of 'that' accompanied by an act of pointing directs \( b \)'s attention to the right feature. It does not, by itself, direct \( b \)'s attention to the right object. For \( b \) also needs to employ a concept in an individuative role. An utterance by \( a \) of 'that man' accompanied by an act of pointing would serve both to direct \( b \)'s attention to the right feature and to arm \( b \) with a concept by employing which his attention could be fixed upon the right object \( d \). An assertoric utterance by \( a \) of 'That man is hot' would serve to communicate \( a \)'s thought to \( b \).

Here we have reached an idea about the use of perceptual demonstratives in communication, analogous to the idea about perceptual demonstrative
thoughts. The concept *being a man* does not serve to make a predication of something already identified in the communicative exchange, but serves to assist in the identification of the object communicated about. (I sacrifice elegance to highlight the analogy.)

### Section 4

It is clear that, in a theory about the nature of perceptual demonstrative thoughts concerning spatio-temporal objects, we must concern ourselves with complex demonstratives rather than with the bare demonstrative 'that'. For in such thoughts the employment of concepts in individuative roles is ineliminable. But it is equally clear that in a semantic theory for a natural language such as English we must make room for the use of the bare demonstrative. Speakers of English do sometimes succeed in directing the attention of an audience to a particular object of a particular sort by an utterance of the bare demonstrative 'that' accompanied, perhaps, by an act of pointing. It is not difficult to see how this might be achieved. We have a greater (human) interest in men than in temporal slices of men, in tomatoes than in front surfaces of tomatoes, in cars than in mereological unions of car parts, and in cats than in aggregates of molecules constituting cats. Once an audience's attention has been directed towards the right feature the audience will naturally tend to fix his attention upon an object of a sort in which he has a greater interest rather than an object of a sort in which he has a lesser interest. And it is common knowledge that all this is so. Such common knowledge as this, together with common knowledge about, for example, the preceding discourse, may remove the need for use of a complex demonstrative in an utterance. An utterance of 'That is heavy' in an appropriate context may have quite determinate truth conditions. The truth of the utterance may depend, for example, upon how things are with a particular demonstrated man, tomato, car or cat.

Let us fix upon a first-order language $L$ which contains some one-place predicates including 'P' and some names including 'm' along with connectives and quantifiers. Suppose that 'P' has the sense of 'is hot', that 'm' names our man $d$, and that $LI$ extends $L$ by allowing the occurrence of indexed bare demonstratives 'that,\textsuperscript{i}' in name positions. There are several ways of providing a truth theory for $LI$; the way I opt for is familiar
The truth predicate ‘Tr’ is relativised to contexts. The axiom for ‘P’ is

\[(\forall c)(\forall \pi)(\forall x) \rightarrow (\text{Ref}(c, \pi, x) \rightarrow (\text{Tr}(c, 'P\pi') \leftrightarrow x \text{ is hot})]\]

in which ‘(\forall c)’ ranges over contexts, ‘(\forall \pi)’ ranges over both names and demonstratives, and the language parameter is suppressed. The axiom for ‘m’ is simply

\[(\forall c)\text{Ref}(c, 'm', d).\]

Connectives and quantifiers in LI are treated exactly as in a truth theory for L, save for the presence of the additional parameter for contexts.

In this truth theory for LI we use what Barry Taylor calls ‘the method of conditional assignment of truth-conditions’. The sentence ‘P(thatr)’ is not true relative to a context c unless there is an object x such that both Ref(c, ‘thatr’, x) and x is hot. The speaker in a context needs to secure a reference (relative to that context) for his demonstrative. But a truth condition specification along the lines of

\[\text{Tr}(c, 'P(thatr)') \leftrightarrow (\exists x)(\text{Ref}(c, 'thatr', x) \& x \text{ is hot})\]

invites trouble when taken together with the obvious truth theoretic treatment of the negation operator ‘¬’. For we find ourselves with

\[\text{Tr}(c, '¬ P(thatr)') \leftrightarrow (\exists x)(\text{Ref}(c, 'thatr', x) \& x \text{ is hot}).\]

And this, together with a theory of utterances which relates truth of sentences and truth of utterances, suggests or even entails that an utterance of ‘¬ P(thatr)’ can be true (correct) in virtue of the speaker’s failing to secure a reference (relative to the context of utterance) for the demonstrative ‘thatr’. Yet it is surely a precondition for the truth (indeed, even for the truth evaluability) of an utterance of ‘¬ P(thatr)’, just as much as for the truth of an utterance of ‘P(thatr)’, that a reference be secured for the demonstrative. The method of conditional assignment of truth conditions respects this precondition. What it delivers for ‘¬ P(thatr)’ is just

\[\text{Ref}(c, 'thatr', x) \rightarrow (\text{Tr}(c, '¬ P(thatr)') \leftrightarrow (x \text{ is hot})).\]

Taylor acknowledges the prima facie attraction of the method of conditional assignment of truth conditions. But he suggests, and ultimately opts for, a different method of skirting around the problems presented by
negation. This second method is 'the method of scope-distinction'. By treating indexed demonstratives as variable binding devices of the same syntactic category as the familiar quantifiers ‘∀’ and ‘∃’, we can distinguish between the externally negated sentence ‘¬ (That₁ v₁)Pv₁’ and the internally negated sentence ‘(That₁ v₁) ¬ Pv₁’. The externally negated sentence has the semantic property that it is made true by reference failure.

\[ Tr(c, ‘¬ (That₁ v₁)Pv₁’) ⇔ ¬ (∃x) (Ref(c, ‘That₁ v₁’, x) \& x \text{ is hot}) \]

On the other hand, the internally negated sentence requires successful reference for its truth.

\[ Tr(c, ‘(That₁ v₁) ¬ Pv₁’) ⇔ (∃x)(Ref(c, ‘That₁ v₁’, x) \& ¬ (x \text{ is hot})) \]

We shall come, in due course, to Taylor's reason for preferring this second method. (See below, at the end of Section 6.) But there seems to me to be a very strong reason for preferring the first method; a reason which is not exhausted by noting that the scope-distinctions of the second method correspond to no intuitive distinction at the level of surface syntax.

In the specification of truth conditions by the second method, the distinction between the externally and internally negated sentences corresponds to a distinction between occurrences of the reference predicate inside and outside the scope of the negation operator. But if we consider the content of the assertion made, in an utterance of the un-negated sentence (written ‘P(that₁)’ or ‘(That₁ v₁)Pv₁’), we find that the concept of reference, like the concept of demonstration and the concept of individuation under a concept, does not enter that content. If the object demonstrated in an utterance of the un-negated sentence is \( n \), and it is clear from the context that the concept \( C \) is employed by the speaker (and is to be employed by the audience) in an individuative role, then the content of the assertion is represented by the ordered triple

\[ \langle n, C, \text{being hot} \rangle \]

or, if the contextually furnished concept \( C \) is deemed not to be involved in the content of the assertion, by the ordered pair

\[ \langle n, \text{being hot} \rangle. \]
In either case, it is the latter ordered pair that determines the truth conditions of the assertion. So there is nothing in the assertoric content of an utterance of \( \mathcal{P}(\text{that}_1) \) (or \( '(\text{That}_1 \text{\textit{v}}_1) \mathcal{P}_1' \)), nothing in what ought, in virtue of that content, to be regarded as the truth condition of such an utterance, and consequently nothing in what ought to be regarded as the truth condition, relative to the context of utterance, of the sentence uttered, which would allow for the two different semantic interactions with negation. Indeed, the method of scope-distinction seems to require that the assertoric content of utterances of the un-negated sentence should be something like

The reference of 'that' (or: the demonstrated object) is hot.

Many of these reflections upon the language \( LI \) containing indexed bare demonstratives carry over to the language \( LJ \) which contains, instead, indexed complex demonstratives. Let us suppose that \( L \) contains a one-place sortal predicate '\( J \)' expressing the sortal concept being a man. Then the language \( LJ \) contains \textit{inter alia} complex demonstratives \( '(\text{That}_1 \text{\textit{v}}_1) \mathcal{J}_1' \).

According to the method of conditional assignment of truth conditions, a truth theory for \( LJ \) will contain such theorems as the following.

\[
(\forall c)[\text{Ref}(c, '(\text{That}_1 \text{\textit{v}}_1) \mathcal{J}_1', x) \rightarrow (\text{Tr}(c, 'P(\text{That}_1 \text{\textit{v}}_1) \mathcal{J}_1') \leftrightarrow x \text{ is hot})]
\]

If, for a particular context of utterance \( c \),

\[
\text{Ref}(c, '(\text{That}_1 \text{\textit{v}}_1) \mathcal{J}_1', d)
\]

then an utterance in that context of

\( P(\text{That}_1 \text{\textit{v}}_1) \mathcal{J}_1 \)

has an assertoric content which can be represented by the ordered triple

\( \langle d, \text{being a man, being hot} \rangle \).

It is clear enough what the semantic function of the matrix of the complex demonstrative is in such cases. The predicate '\( J \)' expresses a concept employed by the speaker, and to be employed by the audience, in an individuative role. This concept serves to individuate in thought the object upon whose being hot the truth of the utterance (and of the sentence relative to the context) depends. Thus with respect to such simple cases, we can answer the first of the two semantic questions with which we began.
SECTION 5

We need to extend our answer to the first semantic question to cover two more difficult kinds of case.

(i) In the first kind of case, the concept expressed by the matrix of a complex demonstrative is neither an ultimate sortal concept nor a concept which is sortal entailing: it is a *sortal indifferent* concept. Examples might be the concepts *being an object*, *being blue*, and *being an object that John likes*.

We have already considered (at the beginning of Section 4) what is really the limiting case of a matrix expressing a sortal indifferent concept, namely the case in which there is no matrix at all. What I said there can be generalised. From the way in which the employment of concepts in individuative roles was introduced (in Section 2), it is clear that if a perceptual demonstrative thought whose intrinsic content is

\[ \langle \Pi, C \rangle, \text{ being } Q \]

is to have an object, then the concept \( C \) must at least be sortal entailing. But speakers of English do sometimes succeed in directing the attention of an audience to a particular object of a particular sort without explicitly expressing that sortal concept in their utterance. For a speaker may trade upon various kinds of common knowledge while expressing a sortal indifferent concept: common knowledge about greater and lesser human interests, common knowledge about the preceding discourse, and even common knowledge about the sorts of objects that John likes.\(^{23}\)

There will remain questions over cases in which the unexpressed but implicit sortal concept individuates an object which does not fall under the explicitly expressed sortal indifferent concept: cases where ‘things go wrong’. But such questions must be answered along with corresponding questions about the use of complex demonstratives whose matrices contain a sortal predicate together with an (apparently) restrictive relative clause; and, more importantly, along with questions about the use of such complex demonstratives in cases where ‘things go right’.

(ii) In the second kind of case, then, the concept expressed by the matrix is not an ultimate sortal concept but is *sortal entailing*. Examples of such far-from-ultimate sortal concepts might be the concepts *being a tall man*,
being a tree with a bird in it, and being a philosopher. Such examples prompt questions concerning the semantic function of the matrix to the extent that it expresses 'excess' conceptual material.

There seem to be three possible accounts of the thought expressed by an utterance containing such a complex demonstrative. Thus, consider an utterance of the sentence

That man wearing a carnation is hot

made to express a thought concerning a man \( d \) who is, indeed, wearing a carnation. According to account (1), the concept expressed by the matrix is employed in an individuative role and the extrinsic content of the thought is (for some \( \Pi \))

\[
\langle d, (\Pi, \text{being a man wearing a carnation}), \text{being hot} \rangle.
\]

According to account (2), only the entailed ultimate sortal concept is employed in an individuative role. The concept expressed by the matrix is itself semantically irrelevant and the extrinsic content of the thought is

\[
\langle d, (\Pi, \text{being a man}), \text{being hot} \rangle.
\]

According to account (3), only the entailed ultimate sortal concept is employed in an individuative role. The concept expressed by the matrix is itself employed in a predicative role and the extrinsic content of the thought is

\[
\langle d, (\Pi, \text{being a man}), (\text{being a man} \text{ wearing a carnation & being hot}) \rangle.
\]

The three accounts yield differing descriptions of communication involving the use of complex demonstratives. The descriptions yielded by accounts (1) and (2) are rather similar.

In order to direct an audience's attention to an object, a speaker has to indicate to his audience a direction, a range, and a sort of object. In very simple cases (in particular, when the matrix itself expresses an ultimate sortal concept) an act of pointing indicates direction and (with the help of some background common knowledge) range, while the matrix of the complex demonstrative indicates a sort of object. But if, for example, there are several men (several objects of the relevant sort) in roughly the same direction and at roughly the same range then it may be that by his act of
pointing the speaker succeeds only in directing the audience’s attention to a feature of the scene before him from which he can individuate several different men (several different objects of the relevant sort). In such a case, what is needed is that the matrix should express extra conceptual material to assist in directing the audience’s attention to the right object.

The difference between the descriptions yielded by accounts (1) and (2) is this. According to account (1), the extra conceptual material is employed in an individuative role. The matrix of the complex demonstrative arms the audience with a richer concept which he can employ in an individuative role in order to individuate the right man even if (because of the vagueness of pointing) his attention is directed to a feature of the scene before him from which several different men can be individuated. According to account (2) on the other hand, only the entailed ultimate sortal concept is employed in an individuative role. The provision of the extra conceptual material is to be assimilated to more accurate pointing, ensuring that the audience’s attention is directed to a narrower feature of the scene from which the ultimate sortal concept can individuate the right man. The occurrence in the matrix of the restrictive relative clause serves a pragmatic rather than a semantic function.

Account (3) yields a very different description of communication involving the use of complex demonstratives. According to that account, only the entailed ultimate sortal concept is employed in an individuative role. The extra conceptual material is employed in a predicative role. The (apparently restrictive) relative clause ‘(who is) wearing a carnation’, for example, serves exactly the same kind of communicative function as the grammatical predicate ‘is hot’, and assists in the identification of the object communicated about only in the very derivative way that the predicate ‘is hot’ also so assists, namely via the audience’s expectation that the speaker is saying something true.

We need not pause to spell out the consequent descriptions of cases of (attempted) communication in which ‘things go wrong’. Obviously, what we say about such cases is heavily constrained by our choice between the three accounts.

SECTION 6

Clearly enough, our initial answer to the first semantic question could be developed into a more comprehensive answer along the lines of any one of
the accounts (1), (2), or (3). But, before making a choice between the accounts, we should note the consequences of each of the three accounts for the second (the more specific) semantic question. According to account (1), the concept expressed by the matrix of a complex demonstrative is employed by the speaker, and is to be employed by the audience, in an individuative role. The concept assists in securing an object for the thought to be about, and this is logically prior to the evaluation of the thought for correctness (truth). Similarly, on the side of communication, the semantic function of the matrix is to express a concept which has a role in securing a reference for the complex demonstrative. This is something logically prior to the evaluation of the utterance, or of the sentence uttered, for truth; indeed, logically prior even to the assignment of truth conditions. Thus, there can be no question of quantifying into name positions within a matrix from outside the matrix so as to construct sentences of the form

\[(Qy)[\Phi(y, (That \, x)\Psi(x, y))].\]

According to account (2), the entailed ultimate sortal concept has the kind of role that, according to account (1), the concept expressed by the whole matrix has. The concept expressed by the matrix is, to the extent that it goes beyond the entailed ultimate sortal concept, semantically irrelevant. Thus, to fix ideas, if the matrix is made up of a sortal predicate plus a restrictive relative clause, then the sortal predicate has the semantic function which, according to account (1), the whole matrix has; and the restrictive relative clause has no semantic function at all. But then, there can be no question of quantifying into name positions within a matrix. For either the considerations of account (1) apply, or else the name position is in a part of the matrix that is semantically irrelevant.

According to account (3) on the other hand, there is no problem over quantifying into name positions within a matrix from outside the matrix. The sentence

\[(\exists y)(y \, \text{likes} \, (\text{That} \, x)(x \, \text{is a man who admires} \, y))\]

is true, relative to a context in which the reference of the demonstrative is the man \(d\), just in case there is some \(y\) such that both \(y\) likes \(d\) and \(d\) admires \(y\). For, according to account (3), the occurrence, in the matrix of a complex demonstrative, of a complex predicate containing an apparently
restrictive relative clause is massively misleading as to underlying semantic structure. The sentence

Mary likes \((\text{That } x)(x \text{ is a man who admires Mary})\)

would be far less misleadingly represented as

Mary likes \((\text{That } x)(x \text{ is a man}) & (\text{That } x)(x \text{ is a man}) \text{ admires Mary.}\)

There is clearly no problem over quantifying into the two positions occupied by the name ‘Mary’ to form the sentence

\((\exists y)(y \text{ likes (That } x)(x \text{ is a man}) & (\text{That } x)(x \text{ is a man}) \text{ admires } y).\)

In Section 3, I gave an initial account of the use of perceptual demonstratives in communication. That account motivated a choice of the method of conditional assignment of truth conditions, and it yielded an initial answer to our first semantic question. What we have just seen is that quantification into the matrix of a complex demonstrative from outside the matrix can be seen as semantically coherent only if the initial answer is developed along the lines of account (3). The formal analogue of this point is that, if we adopt the method of conditional assignment of truth conditions, then the truth theory cannot deal with sentences involving such quantification (unless, of course, the appearance of such quantification in the surface form is massively misleading as to the form to be assigned to the sentences at the level of input to the truth theory). Since we lack any independent reason for supposing that account (3) is correct, I conclude that such quantification is indeed semantically incoherent.

As for the choice between accounts (1) and (2), I shall say only that in the absence of any argument to show that only ultimate sortal concepts can be employed in individuative roles, account (1) seems to me to be the more natural of the two. It avoids any difficulty that may be raised by the question whether a speaker will always know what the entailed ultimate sortal concept is. And it takes more seriously the syntactic form of complex demonstratives.

I have now returned answers to the two semantic questions with which I began. But there is one loose end to be tied up. The initial account of the use of perceptual demonstratives in communication motivated the choice of
the method of conditional assignment of truth conditions. But I did not, at
that point (in Section 4), consider Taylor's own reason for choosing instead
the method of scope-distinction. So there is room for a nagging worry that
his reason might also oblige us to abandon even our initial account.

In fact we need not worry. Taylor's reason for preferring the method of
scope-distinction is precisely that it enables him to deal with sentences
involving the controversial kind of quantification. According to that
method, the sentence

Someone loathes that denigrator of his

is true, relative to a context in which the demonstrated object is the man d,
just in case there is some y such that both (i) y loathes d, and (ii) d is
demonstrated as a denigrator of y (or d is individuated under the concept
being a denigrator of y). But, of course, that cannot be a reason for
abandoning an account according to which the sentences in question are
semantically incoherent.

SECTION 7

Some of the claims of this paper seem to gain support (however limited)
from empirical facts about the reactions of language users to sentences of
the dubious kind when it is made clear that the demonstratives are supposed
to be interpreted as perceptual demonstratives. Here are three claims:

(i) account (3) is not correct;
(ii) the content of assertions does not involve such concepts as
reference, demonstration, or individuation;
(iii) quantification into the matrix of a complex demonstrative
would be coherent only if account (3) were correct.

Now consider the sentence

Someone loathes that denigrator of his.

Whatever this first sentence means, it does not mean anything very different
from

Someone loathes that man who denigrates him.

According to claim (iii), that second sentence is semantically coherent only
if what is apparently a restrictive relative clause occurring within the matrix of a complex demonstrative is, in semantic reality, a non-restrictive relative clause, so that the sentence is equivalent to

Someone both loathes and is denigrated by that man.

When language users are presented with the first sentence they typically regard it as bizarre. (That supports claim (i).) They do not impose upon the sentence an interpretation involving such concepts as reference, demonstration, or individuation. (That supports claim (ii).) Rather, to the extent that they are able to impose any interpretation upon it at all, they interpret it as equivalent to the third sentence. (That supports claim (iii).)

The semantic claims I have made in this paper are claims about perceptual demonstratives; that is to say, about demonstrative expressions used as perceptual demonstratives. But demonstrative expressions also have semantically quite different uses. Consequently, nothing in the paper requires the claim that such a string as

Some woman likes that left-handed man who admires her

is not a well-formed sentence of English. On the contrary, that is a well-formed sentence, and it could occur quite naturally in the following linguistic context.

For every woman there are several left-handed men who admire her, and amongst those left-handed men one is the most ardent. Some woman likes that left-handed man who admires her.

This anaphoric use of ‘that’ results in a sentence whose semantic value in that linguistic context is just that of

Some woman likes the most ardent left-handed man who admires her.

Similarly, and indeed more simply, nothing in the paper requires the claim that such a string as

Most women like that man (those men) who most ardently admires (admire) them

is not a well-formed sentence of English. On the contrary, it could occur
quite naturally in any context in which 'that' (or 'those') was heard as equivalent to 'the'.

Syntax need not distinguish between the anaphoric 'that' and the 'that' which shades into 'the' on the one hand, and the perceptual demonstrative 'that' on the other. But semantically they are quite different. Here is one more point at which syntax and semantics do not go neatly in step.

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**NOTES**

* Many of the ideas in this paper were picked up from lectures, seminars, and conversations involving Tyler Burge, Gareth Evans, Lloyd Humberstone, David Kaplan, Brian Loar, Christopher Peacocke, John Perry, Stephen Schiffer, and Barry Taylor. My debts to the papers by Peacocke [1981] and Taylor [1980] are enormous.

An earlier version of the paper was written during an enjoyable year spent as a Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne.

1  Taylor [1980].
2  Peacocke [1981].
3  My choice of terminology was influenced by McGinn [1982].
4  Perry [1977], [1979], [1980a], [1980b].
5  Perry [1982], Kaplan [1977].
7  Peacocke [1981], p. 189.
8  Evans [1981], p. 280, Perry [1982].
10  Perry [1982].
11  I am indebted here to Francis Dauer and Christopher Peacocke.
12  Kaplan [1977].
13  My use of the notion of a sortal concept is supposed to conform to that of Strawson [1959] and Wiggins [1980].
14  Peacocke [1981], p. 201; I have altered the example and the notation.
16  Brian Loar and Christopher Peacocke helped me to get clearer about the points of this paragraph and the next few. When considering the speaker's intentions about the audience's thought, it is instructive to consider the use of 'you'.
17  Cf. the argument against the _Principle of Expressibility_ in Schiffer [1981].
18  The referential content is already enough to determine the truth conditions of the assertion. The extra component in the assertoric content is relevant not to the truth or falsity of the assertion, but to the characterisation of the associated beliefs of the speaker and the audience. This is, indeed, a feature of any account of the contents of assertions which cuts those contents more finely than truth conditional equivalence. I am indebted here to Stephen Schiffer and Barry Taylor. Note that Schiffer [1981] takes the referential content as the content of the assertion.
INDIVIDUATION AND DEMONSTRATIVES

19 Quine [1974], p. 44.
20 For a different way, see Weinstein [1974].
21 Taylor [1980], p. 188.
22 ibid.
23 I do not deny that sometimes, when there is no risk of a difference in truth value, a speaker may leave the reference of his demonstrative partially indeterminate.
24 The employment of the concept being a man wearing a carnation in an individuative role will be accompanied by a willingness to judge concerning that man d that he is wearing a carnation; and in that judgement the concept wearing a carnation is employed in a predicative role. This fact is relevant in cases where ‘things go wrong’.
26 Christopher Peacocke has suggested to me that we can find reasons for favouring account (1), if we consider non-visual examples. In some such examples, it seems that if a thought is to have an object then non-sortal material must play an individuative role.
28 In fact there is a complication here, for language users have even greater difficulty with the sentence

No one loathes that denigrator of his.

I suspect that this extra difficulty may be related to the fact that, to the extent that the sentence is interpreted in such a way that ‘his’ belongs in a non-restrictive relative clause, the position occupied by the quantifier does not govern the position occupied by the pronoun ‘his’. Consequently it is difficult to interpret the pronoun as bound by the quantifier. A different interpretation of the pronoun is possible when its antecedent is ‘someone’ but not when its antecedent is ‘no one’. This complication can be corrected for, if we consider the sentence

Someone is such that he loathes that denigrator of his

and the corresponding sentence with ‘no one’.

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