The ‘Peircean pathway’ model of abduction and belief formation

and the two-factor theory of delusion

A series of papers with Max Coltheart

Davies, M. and Coltheart, M.

The two-factor theory. (2025)

        In E. Sullivan-Bissett (ed.),

        Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion.

        London: Routledge, 430–449.

Coltheart, M. and Davies, M.

Delusional belief about location (‘reduplicative paramnesia’). (2024)           

       Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 29, 268–285.

Coltheart, M. and Davies, M.

Koro: a socially-transmitted delusional belief. (2024)

      Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 29, 10–28

Davies, M. and Coltheart, M.

Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation. (2022)

     Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 27, 430–446.

Coltheart, M. and Davies, M.

What is Capgras delusion? (2022)

      Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 27, 69–82.

Coltheart, M. and Davies, M.

Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief. (2021)

       Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 26, 213–230.   

Coltheart, M. and Davies, M.

How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. (2021)

       Consciousness and Cognition, 87(103037), 1–13.

Davies, M. and Coltheart, M.

A Peircean pathway from surprising facts to new beliefs. (2020)

       Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 56, 400–426.

Anosognosia and other delusions

Davies, M., McGill, C.L. and Aimola Davies, A.M.

Anosognosia for motor impairments as a delusion:

Anomalies of experience and belief evaluation. (2024)

        In A.L. Mishara, M. Moskalewicz, M.A. Schwartz and A. Kranjec (eds),

        Phenomenological Neuropsychiatry:

        How Patient Experience Bridges the Clinic with Clinical Neuroscience.

        New York: Springer, 175–197.

Davies, M. and Egan, A.

Delusion, cognitive approaches: Bayesian inference and compartmentalisation. (2013)

        In K.W.M. Fulford, M. Davies, R.G.T. Gipps, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini

        and T. Thornton (eds),

        The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry.

        Oxford: Oxford University Press, 689–727.

Aimola Davies, A.M., White, R.C. and Davies, M.

Assessment of anosognosia for motor impairments. (2010)

        In J.M. Gurd, U. Kischka and J.C. Marshall (eds),

        Handbook of Clinical Neuropsychology (Second Edition).

        Oxford: Oxford University Press, 436–68.

Aimola Davies, A.M., Davies, M., Ogden, J.A., Smithson, M. and White, R.C.

Cognitive and motivational factors in anosognosia. (2009)

        In T. Bayne and J. Fernández (eds), Delusions and Self-Deception:

        Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation.

        Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 187–225.

Delusion and motivationally biased belief: Self-deception in the two-factor framework.

(2009)

        In T. Bayne and J. Fernández (eds), Delusions and Self-Deception:

        Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation.

        Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 71–86.

Aimola Davies, A.M. and Davies, M.

Explaining pathologies of belief. (2009)

        In M.R. Broome and L. Bortolotti (eds),

        Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives.

        Oxford: Oxford University Press, 285–323.

Davies, M., Aimola Davies, A.M. and Coltheart, M.

Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions. (2005)

        Mind & Language, 20, 209–36.

Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R. and Breen, N.

Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account. (2001)

        Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 8, 133–58.

Davies, M. and Coltheart, M.

Introduction: Pathologies of belief. (2000)

        Mind & Language, 15, 1–46.

Glyn Humphreys

Glyn Humphreys: Attention, binding, motion-induced blindness. (2017)

        Mind & Language, 32, 127–54.

Cognitive neuropsychology

Smithson, M., Davies, M. and Aimola Davies, A.M.

Exploiting test structure: Case series, case-control comparison, and dissociation. (2011)

        Cognitive Neuropsychology, 28, 44–64.

Double dissociation: Understanding its role in cognitive neuropsychology. (2010)

        Mind & Language, 25, 500–40.

Coltheart, M. and Davies, M.

Inference and explanation in cognitive neuropsychology. (2003)

        Cortex, 39, 188–91.

Stone, T. and Davies, M.

Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind. (1993)

        British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44, 589–622.

Coltheart, M. and Davies, M.

Le concept de modularité à l’épreuve de la neuropsychologie. (1992)

        In D. Andler (ed.), Introduction aux Sciences Cognitives.

        Paris: Gallimard, 109–130.

Tacit knowledge and implicit rules

Knowledge (explicit, implicit and tacit): Philosophical aspects. (2015)

        In J.D. Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences,

        Second Edition.

        Oxford: Elsevier Ltd., 13, 74–90.

Knowledge (explicit and implicit): Philosophical aspects. (2001)

        In N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds),

        International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.

        Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Ltd., 12, 8126–32.

Two notions of implicit rules. (1995)

        In J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 9:

        AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology.

        Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 153–83.

Rules and competence in connectionist networks.(1990)

        In J.E. Tiles, G.T. McKee and G.C. Dean (eds),

        Evolving Knowledge in Natural Science and Artificial Intelligence.

        London: Pitman, 85–114.

Knowledge of rules in connectionist networks. (1990)

        Intellectica nos. 9–10: D. Memmi and Y.M. Visetti (eds),

        Modèles Connexionnistes, 81–126.

Connectionism, modularity, and tacit knowledge. (1989)

        British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40, 541–55.

Tacit knowledge and subdoxastic states. (1989)

        In A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky.

        Oxford: Blackwell, 131–52.

        Reprinted in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds),

        Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation.

        Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995, 309–30.

Tacit knowledge and semantic theory: Can a five per cent difference matter? (1987)

        Mind, 96, 441–62..

Tacit knowledge, and the structure of thought and language. (1986)

        In C. Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation.

        Oxford: Blackwell, 127–58.

Everyday psychological understanding: Theory and simulation

Davies, M. and Stone, T.

Psychological understanding and social skills. (2003)

        In B. Repacholi and V. Slaughter (eds), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind:

        Implications for Typical and Atypical Development.

        Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science.

        Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 305–52.

Davies, M. and Stone, T.

Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. (2001)

        Philosophical Topics, 29, 127–73.

Davies, M. and Stone, T.

Simulation theory. (2000)

        In E.J. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.

        London: Routledge.

Davies, M. and Stone, T.

Folk psychology and mental simulation. (1998)

        In A. O’Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind:

        Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42.

        Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 53–82.

Stone, T. and Davies, M.

The mental simulation debate: A progress report. (1996)

        In P. Carruthers and P.K. Smith (eds), Theories of Theories of Mind.

        Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 119–37.

The mental simulation debate. (1994)

        In C. Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness:

        Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind.

        Proceedings of the British Academy vol. 83, 99–127.

       

Selected other papers in cognitive science

Stone, T. and Davies, M.

Chomsky amongst the philosophers. (2002)

        Mind & Language, 17, 276–89.

Langdon, R., Davies, M. and Coltheart, M.

Understanding minds and understanding communicated meanings in schizophrenia. (2002)

        Mind & Language, 17, 68–104.

Language, thought, and the language of thought (Aunty’s own argument revisited). (1998)

        In P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds), Language and Thought.

        Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 226–47

Survey chapters on cognitive science

Stone, T. and Davies, M.

Theoretical issues in cognitive psychology. (2012)

        In N. Braisby and A. Gellatly (eds), Cognitive Psychology (Second Edition).

        Oxford: Oxford University Press, 639–79.

An approach to philosophy of cognitive science. (2005)

        Expanded version of a chapter in F. Jackson and M. Smith (eds),

        The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy.

        Oxford: Oxford University Press, 358–94.