

CURRICULUM VITAE

Martin Kinsey Davies, FASSA, FAHA

Emeritus Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy, University of Oxford

Emeritus Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford

Adjunct Professor in the School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University; and

Distinguished Visiting Focus Professor in Monash University Philosophy Department's Focus Program on Belief, Value, and Mind

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PERSONAL

Date of birth 6 July 1950

Citizenship British

Permanent Residence Australia

EDUCATION

1968–72 B.A. (Hons) with first class honours in philosophy and mathematics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

1973–75 B.Phil. (distinction), New College, Oxford

1975–76 D.Phil., New College, Oxford (awarded 1977)

EMPLOYMENT

April 2006–September 2017 Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy, University of Oxford, and Fellow of Corpus Christi College

2000–2006 Professor of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University, Canberra

1996–2000 Professor of Philosophy, University of Oxford

1993–2000 Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy, University of Oxford

1987–1992 Reader, Philosophy Department, Birkbeck College, University of London

1981–1987 Lecturer, Philosophy Department, Birkbeck College, University of London (tenured from 1983)

1977–1981 Fellow by Examination, Magdalen College, Oxford

1976–1977 Lecturer, Philosophy Department, University of Essex

HONOURS

Elected a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, September, 2002.

Carl G. Hempel Lectures (three lecture series), Princeton University, 22–26 September, 2003.

Elected a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, November, 2003.

Seventh Weatherhead Lecture in Philosophy of Language, Tulane University, 11 February, 2005.

Chichele Lectures (six lecture series with C. Frith, C. Heyes, J. LeDoux, D. Milner and A. Zeman), All Souls College, Oxford, April–June, 2006.

PUBLICATIONS

Books

1. *Meaning, Quantification, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical Logic*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981 (xii + 282 pp.). Reprinted in Routledge Library Editions: Logic, Volume 6. Abingdon: Routledge, 2020.
2. Davies, M. and Humphreys, G.W. (eds), *Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993 (including Introduction, 1–39).
3. Davies, M. and Stone, T. (eds), *Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995 (including Introduction, 1–44).
4. Davies, M. and Stone, T. (eds), *Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995 (including Introduction, 1–18).
5. Coltheart, M. and Davies, M. (eds), *Pathologies of Belief*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000 (including Introduction, 1–46).
6. Weiskrantz, L. and Davies, M. (eds), *Frontiers of Consciousness: Chichele Lectures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
7. Fulford, K.W.M., Davies, M., Gipps, R.G.T., Graham, G., Sadler, J., Stanghellini, G., and Thornton, T. (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Articles and chapters

1. Weak necessity and truth theories. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 7 (1978), 415–39.
2. Davies, M. and Humberstone, I.L. Two notions of necessity. *Philosophical Studies*, 38 (1980), 1–30.
3. Determinism and evil. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 58 (1980), 116–27.
4. A note on substitutional quantification. *Noûs*, 14 (1980), 619–22.
5. Meaning, structure, and understanding. *Synthese*, 48 (1981), 135–61.
6. Sentence modifiers and semantic theories: A note on a conjecture. *Analysis*, 42 (1982), 7–11.
7. Idiom and metaphor. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 83 (1982), 67–85.
8. Individuation and the semantics of demonstratives. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 11 (1982), 287–310. Reprinted in P. Ludlow (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, 745–67.
9. Actuality and context dependence. *Analysis*, 43 (1983), 128–33.
10. Function in perception. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 61 (1983), 409–26.
11. Meaning and structure. *Philosophia*, 13 (1983), 13–33.
12. Boethius and others on divine foreknowledge. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 64 (1983), 313–29. Reprinted in J.M. Fischer (ed.), *God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, 274–93.
13. Taylor on meaning-theories and theories of meaning. *Mind*, 93 (1984), 85–90.
14. Tacit knowledge, and the structure of thought and language. In C. Travis (ed.), *Meaning and Interpretation*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, 127–58.
15. Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 60 (1986), 263–83.
16. Tacit knowledge and semantic theory: Can a five per cent difference matter? *Mind*, 96 (1987), 441–62.
17. Relevance and mutual knowledge. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 10 (1987), 716–17.

18. Davies, M. and Harris, M. Learning and triggering in child language: A response to Atkinson. *First Language*, 7 (1987), 31–9.
19. La connaissance tacite. *Hermès* no.3 (1988), 85–108.
20. Tacit knowledge and subdoxastic states. In A. George (ed.), *Reflections on Chomsky*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, 131–52. Reprinted in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds), *Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995, 309–30.
21. ‘Two examiners marked six scripts’: Interpretations of numerically quantified sentences. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 12 (1989), 293–323.
22. Connectionism, modularity, and tacit knowledge. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 40 (1989), 541–55.
23. Adverbial modification and perception reports. *Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage* no.10 (1989), 137–56.
24. Knowledge of rules in connectionist networks. *Intellectica* nos. 9–10 (1990): D. Memmi and Y.M. Visetti (eds), *Modèles Connexionnistes*, 81–126.
25. Thinking persons and cognitive science. *AI & Society*, 4 (1990), 39–50. Reprinted in A. Clark and R. Lutz (eds), *Connectionism in Context*. London: Springer-Verlag, 1992, 111–122.
26. Rules and competence in connectionist networks. In J.E. Tiles, G.T. McKee and G.C. Dean (eds), *Evolving Knowledge in Natural Science and Artificial Intelligence*. London: Pitman, 1990, 85–114.
27. Acts and scenes. In N. Cooper and P. Engel (eds), *New Inquiries into Meaning and Truth*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, 41–82.
28. Individualism and perceptual content. *Mind*, 100 (1991), 461–84.
29. Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought. In W. Ramsey, S. Stich and D. Rumelhart (eds), *Philosophy and Connectionist Theory*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991, 229–257.
30. Perceptual content and local supervenience. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 92 (1992), 21–45.
31. Aunty’s own argument for the language of thought. In J. Ezquerro and J.M. Larrazabal (eds), *Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy: Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Cognitive Science*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, 235–271.
32. Coltheart, M. and Davies, M. Le concept de modularité à l’épreuve de la neuropsychologie. In D. Andler (ed.), *Introduction aux Sciences Cognitives*. Paris: Gallimard, 1992, 109–130.
33. Aims and claims of externalist arguments. In E. Villanueva (ed.) *Philosophical Issues Volume 4: Naturalism and Normativity*. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1993, 227–49.
34. Modal logic. In *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*. Pergamon Press/ Aberdeen University Press, 1993. Reprinted in P.V. Lamarque (ed.), *Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language*. Elsevier Science Ltd., 1997, 336–44.
35. Stone, T. and Davies, M. Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 44 (1993), 589–622.
36. The mental simulation debate. In C. Peacocke (ed.), *Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind* (Proceedings of the British Academy vol. 83). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 99–127. Reprinted in E. Villanueva (ed.) *Philosophical Issues Volume 5: Truth and Rationality*. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1994, 189–218; and in W.G. Lycan (ed.), *Mind and Cognition: An Anthology* (Second Edition). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999, 414–28.

37. Consciousness and the varieties of aboutness. In C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (eds), *Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995, 356–92.
38. Philosophy of mind. In A. C. Grayling (ed.), *Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 250–335.
39. Two notions of implicit rules. In J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives, 9: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology*. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1995, 153–83.
40. Atkinson, A.P. and Davies, M. Consciousness without conflation. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 18 (1995), 248–9.
41. Philosophy of language. In N. Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, 90–139. Revised version in Second Edition, 2003, 90–146.
42. Externalism and experience. In A. Clark, J. Ezquerro and J.M. Larrazabal (eds), *Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness and Reasoning*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, 1–33. Reprinted in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, 309–27.
43. Stone, T. and Davies, M. The mental simulation debate: A progress report. In P. Carruthers and P.K. Smith (eds), *Theories of Theories of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 119–37.
44. Language, thought, and the language of thought (Aunty's own argument revisited). In P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds), *Language and Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 226–47.
45. Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant. In C. Wright, B.C. Smith and C. Macdonald (eds), *Knowing Our Own Minds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 321–61.
46. Davies, M. and Stone, T. Folk psychology and mental simulation. In A. O'Hear (ed.), *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind* (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 53–82.
47. Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and information processing psychology. In C. Taddei-Feretti and C. Musio (eds), *Neuronal Bases and Psychological Aspects of Consciousness*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 1999, 300–14.
48. Consciousness and thought. In C. Taddei-Feretti and C. Musio (eds), *Neuronal Bases and Psychological Aspects of Consciousness*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 1999, 315–27.
49. Stone, T. and Davies, M. Autonomous psychology and the moderate neuron doctrine. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 22 (1999), 849–50.
50. Davies, M. and Coltheart, M. Introduction: Pathologies of belief. *Mind & Language*, 15 (2000), 1–46.
51. Persons and their underpinnings. *Philosophical Explorations*, 3 (2000), 43–62.
- 51a. Methodologische Grundlagen für wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zu selbstbewußten Personen. German version of #51 in A. Newen and K. Vogetley (eds), *Selbst und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbewußtsein und seine neurobiologischen Grundlagen*. Paderborn : Mentis-Verlag, 2000, 153–74.
52. Externalism and armchair knowledge. In P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds), *New Essays on the A Priori*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 384–414.
53. Interaction without reduction: The relationship between personal and sub-personal levels of description. *Mind and Society*, 1(2) (2000), 87–105.

54. Knowledge (explicit and implicit): Philosophical aspects. In N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Ltd., 2001, Volume 12, 8126–32.
55. Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R. and Breen, N. Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology*, 8 (2001), 133–58.
56. Davies, M. and Stone, T. Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. *Philosophical Topics*, 29 (2001), 127–73.
57. Langdon, R., Davies, M. and Coltheart, M. Understanding minds and understanding communicated meanings in schizophrenia. *Mind & Language*, 17 (2002), 68–104.
58. Stone, T. and Davies, M. Chomsky amongst the philosophers. *Mind & Language*, 17 (2002), 276–89.
59. Coltheart, M. and Davies, M. Inference and explanation in cognitive neuropsychology. *Cortex*, 39 (2003), 188–91.
60. The problem of armchair knowledge. In S. Nuccetelli (ed.), *New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003, 23–55.
61. Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant. In M.J. Frápolli and E. Romero (eds), *Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge*. Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2003, 99–124.
62. Davies, M. and Stone, T. Psychological understanding and social skills. In B. Repacholi and V. Slaughter (eds), *Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development* (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2003, 305–52.
63. Davies, M. and Stoljar, D. Introduction. *Philosophical Studies*, 118 (2004) (issue 1–2: *The Two-Dimensional Framework and its Applications: Metaphysics, Language, and Mind*), 1–10.
64. Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework. *Philosophical Studies*, 118 (2004), 83–131. Reprinted in M. García-Carpintero and J. Macià (eds), *Two-Dimensional Semantics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 141–75.
65. Epistemic entitlement, warrant transmission, and easy knowledge. *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 78 (2004), 213–45.
66. Aunty's argument and armchair knowledge. In J.M. Larrazabal and L.A. Pérez Miranda (eds), *Language, Knowledge, and Representation*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, 19–37.
67. Davies, M., Aimola Davies, A.M. and Coltheart, M. Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions. *Mind & Language*, 20 (2005), 209–36.
68. Cognitive science. In F. Jackson and M. Smith (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 358–94.
69. Foundational issues in the philosophy of language. In M. Devitt and R. Hanley (eds), *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Language*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2006, 19–40.
70. Consciousness and explanation. In L. Weiskrantz and M. Davies (eds), *Frontiers of Consciousness: Chichele Lectures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 1–53.
71. Delusion and motivationally biased belief: Self-deception in the two-factor framework. In T. Bayne and J. Fernández (eds), *Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation*. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2009, 71–86.
72. Aimola Davies, A.M., Davies, M., Ogden, J.A., Smithson, M. and White, R.C. Cognitive and motivational factors in anosognosia. In T. Bayne and J. Fernández (eds), *Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation*. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2009, 187–225.

73. Two purposes of arguing and two epistemic projects. In I. Ravenscroft (ed.), *Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 337–83.
74. Aimola Davies, A.M. and Davies, M. Explaining pathologies of belief. In M.R. Broome and L. Bortolotti (eds), *Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 285–323.
75. Brain and mind. In M.G. Gelder, N.C. Andreasen, J.J. López-Ibor and J.R. Geddes (eds), *The New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry* (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 133–6.
76. White, R.C., Aimola Davies, A.M., Kischka, U. and Davies, M. Touch and feel? Using the rubber hand paradigm to investigate self-touch enhancement in right-hemisphere stroke patients. *Neuropsychologia*, 48 (2010), 26–37.
77. White, R.C., Aimola Davies, A.M., Halleen, T.J. and Davies, M. Tactile expectations and the perception of self-touch: An investigation using the rubber hand paradigm. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 19 (2010), 505–19.
78. Aimola Davies, A.M., White, R.C. and Davies, M. Assessment of anosognosia for motor impairments. In J.M. Gurd, U. Kischka and J.C. Marshall (eds), *Handbook of Clinical Neuropsychology* (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 436–68.
79. Aimola Davies, A.M., White, R.C., Thew, G., Aimola, N.M.V. and Davies, M. Visual capture of action, experience of ownership and the illusion of self-touch: A new rubber hand paradigm. *Perception*, 39 (2010), 830–8.
80. Double dissociation: Understanding its role in cognitive neuropsychology. *Mind & Language*, 25 (2010), 500–40. Reprinted in A.D. Smith and C.J.A. Moulin (eds), *Neuropsychology* (Sage Benchmarks series, six-volume set). London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2012, Volume 1, 251–91.
81. White, R.C., Aimola Davies, A.M. and Davies, M. Two hands are better than one: A new assessment method and a new interpretation of the non-visual illusion of self-touch. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 20 (2011), 956–64.
82. Smithson, M., Davies, M. and Aimola Davies, A.M. Exploiting test structure: Case series, case-control comparison, and dissociation. *Cognitive Neuropsychology*, 28 (2011), 44–64.
83. Stone, T. and Davies, M. Theoretical issues in cognitive psychology. In N. Braisby and A. Gellatly (eds), *Cognitive Psychology* (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 639–79.
84. Aimola Davies, A.M., Waterman, S., White, R.C. and Davies, M. When you fail to see what you were told to look for: Inattention blindness and task instructions. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 22 (2013), 221–30.
85. Aimola Davies, A.M., White, R.C. and Davies, M. Spatial limits on the nonvisual self-touch illusion and the visual rubber hand illusion: Subjective experience of the illusion and proprioceptive drift. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 22 (2013), 613–36.
86. Davies, M. and Egan, A. Delusion, cognitive approaches: Bayesian inference and compartmentalisation. In K.W.M. Fulford, M. Davies, R.G.T. Gipps, G. Graham, J. Sadler, G. Stanghellini and T. Thornton (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 689–727.
87. Rosenthal, O., Davies, M., Aimola Davies, A.M. and Humphreys, G.W. A role of 3-D surface-from-motion cues in motion-induced blindness. *Perception*, 42 (2013), 1353–61.
88. Knowledge (explicit, implicit and tacit): Philosophical aspects. In J.D. Wright (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition*. Oxford: Elsevier Ltd., 2015, Volume 13, 74–90.
89. Glyn Humphreys: Attention, binding, motion-induced blindness. *Mind & Language*, 32 (2017), 127–54.

90. White, R.C., Davies, M. and Aimola Davies, A.M. Inattentional blindness on the full-attention trial: Are we throwing out the baby with the bathwater? *Consciousness and Cognition*, 59 (2018), 64–77.
91. Davies, M. and Coltheart, M. A Peircean pathway from surprising facts to new beliefs. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, in press.
92. Davies, M., McGill, C.L. and Aimola Davies, A.M. Anosognosia for motor impairments as a delusion: Anomalies of experience and belief evaluation. In A.L. Mishara, P.R. Corlett, P.C. Fletcher, A. Kranjec and M.A. Schwartz (eds), *Phenomenological Neuropsychiatry: How Patient Experience Bridges Clinic with Clinical Neuroscience*. New York: Springer, in press.

Work in progress

- Coltheart, M. and Davies, M. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway.
- Davies, M., McGill, C.L. and Aimola Davies, A.M. Implicit knowledge in anosognosia for motor impairments: A theoretical review.
- Aimola Davies, A.M., Mansell, S., Tompkins, M.L., White, R.C. and Davies, M. When we can't see the Zoo for the Animals: The A to Z of inattentional blindness.

Reviews and short encyclopaedia entries

1. Review of R. Grandy, *Advanced Logic for Applications*. *Mind*, 88 (1979), 621–4.
2. Review of S. Kanger and S. Öhman (eds), *Philosophy and Grammar*. *Mind*, 93 (1984), 149–52.
3. Review of D. Lewis, *Philosophical Papers Volume 1*. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 37 (1986), 130–4.
4. Review of M. Boden, *Computer Models of Mind*. *Times Higher Education Supplement*, July 29, 1988, p. 20.
5. Review of H. Leblanc, 'Alternatives to standard first-order semantics', in D. Gabbay and F. Guenther (eds), *Handbook of Philosophical Logic Volume 1: Elements of Classical Logic* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983). *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 54 (1989), 1483–4.
6. Review of C. McGinn, *Mental Content*. *Mind & Language*, 5 (1990), 245–8.
7. Review of R.G.M. Morris (ed.), *Parallel Distributed Processing: Implications for Psychology and Neurobiology*. *The Psychologist*, 3 (1990), 558–9.
8. Meaning: Literal meaning and semantic theories. In H. Burkhardt and B. Smith (eds), *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*. Munich: Philosophia, 1991, 510–5.
9. Two entries, 'Meaning' and 'Language and thought'. In D.M. Borchert (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement*. New York: Macmillan, 1996.
10. Consciousness. In R.A. Wilson and F.C. Keil (eds), *The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999, 190–3.
11. Davies, M. and Stone, T. Simulation theory. In E.J. Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online*. London: Routledge, 2000.
12. Gareth Evans. In D.M. Borchert (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Second Edition). Macmillan Reference USA, 2006.

VISITING APPOINTMENTS

Adjunct Professor in the School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University; and Distinguished Visiting Focus Professor in Monash University Philosophy Department's Focus Program on Belief, Value, and Mind, since March 2018.

Visiting Fellow, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, May–December, 2013.

Professeur invité, Département d'Etudes Cognitives de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, March–April, 2008.

Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, January–March, 2005.

Visiting Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Graduate Center, City University of New York, January–May, 2004.

Marshall M. Weinberg Distinguished Visiting Professor in Philosophy, University of Michigan, September–December, 2001.

Erskine Fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, February–March, 2001.

Visiting Fellow, RSSH, Australian National University, August–October, 1999.

Visiting Fellow, RSSH, Australian National University, December 1998–January 1999.

Visiting Research Scholar, Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, August, 1997.

James B. and Grace J. Nelson Philosopher-in-Residence, University of Michigan, April, 1997.

Visiting Fellow, RSSH, Australian National University, July–September, 1996.

Visiting Fellow, School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, July–August 1994.

Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, July 1992–January 1993.

Spatial Representation project, King's College Research Centre, Cambridge, January–March, 1992.

Visiting Scientist, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, January–June, 1991.

Visiting Fellow, RSSH, Australian National University, November–December, 1990.

Visiting Fellow, University of New South Wales, July–November, 1990.

Visiting Scientist, Center for Cognitive Science, MIT, January–June, 1990.

Visiting Fellow, RSSH, Australian National University, July–September, 1989.

Visiting Fellow, RSSH, Australian National University, October–December, 1987.

Visiting Scholar, CSLI, Stanford University, March–April, 1985.

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Melbourne, 1980–81.

Visiting Lecturer, Monash University, January–June, 1979.

GRANTS

- Leverhulme Trust Research Project grant, 2011–13, with G.W. Humphreys: Empirical and philosophical analyses of motion-induced blindness.
- Australian Research Council Discovery Project grant, 2006–08, with D. Stoljar and C. Wright: Epistemic warrant: Transmission failure, basic knowledge, and entitlement.
- Australian Research Council Linkage International grant, 2005–07, with T. Bayne, P. Menzies and others: Developing a two-factor model of delusions: Experience, belief and folk psychology.
- Australian Research Council Discovery Project grant, 2003–05, with D. Stoljar and I. Gold: Perception, interpretation, and the explanation of delusional beliefs.
- British Council grant under UK/HK Joint Research Scheme, 1999–2000, with J. Lau (Hong Kong University): Structured representations in connectionist networks.
- Royal Society study visit grant, July–August 1994: Do PDP models of word recognition learn rules?
- Australian Psychological Society, Visiting Fellowship, July–August 1994: Do PDP models of word recognition learn rules?
- British Academy small personal research grant, January–June 1991: Tacit knowledge in linguistic theory.
- University of New South Wales Cognitive Science Research Grant, 1991; with S. Andrews and P. Ward (UNSW): Reading aloud in networks and children.
- Radcliffe Fellowship, 1990–91: Language and language.
- Birkbeck College Research Grant, January–July 1990: Public communication and internal grammar.
- British Academy small grant, July–September 1989: Concepts, competence, and connectionism.
- Grants from the French Embassy, London and the British Council, Paris, 1988–90; with A. Woodfield (Bristol) and P. Engel (Paris): Language, communication and cognition: Philosophy and cognitive studies in France and Britain.
- Birkbeck College Research Grant, January–July 1987: Tacit knowledge.
- Birkbeck College Research Grant, 1986–87; with S. Guttenplan, M. Coltheart and M. Harris: Ambiguity in sentence comprehension.
- British Academy small grant, March–May 1985: Interpretation of quantified sentences.